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Moral motivation and judgment in virtue ethics 
Rui SAMPAIO DA SILVA  
(University of the Azores, Portugal) 
(Labcom.IFP – University of Beira Interior, Portugal) 
Contemporary normative ethics is dominated by three movements: 
deontological ethics, with a focus on duties or obligations; consequentialism, 
with a distinctive emphasis on the outcomes of actions; and virtue ethics, 
which is centred on the moral agent. Because it rejects rule-based accounts 
of ethics (like consequentialism and deontological ethics), virtue ethics 
dedicates special attention to our capacity for moral judgment, understood   
as a practical capacity that cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge. In 
this article, I will analyse the nature of moral motivation (1) and the idea             
of moral perception in virtue ethics (2), the structure of moral judgment (3), 
its relation to rules or principles (4) and, finally, the conditions of its 
reliability (5). 
1. Moral motivation in virtue ethics
The agent’s motivation does not play a particularly important role in 
consequentialist ethics, because moral decisions are based on an impersonal 
and objective evaluation of the consequences of actions. On the other hand, 
Kant’s moral philosophy, the example par excellence of a deontological 
ethics, is characterized by an austere, restrictive account of moral 
motivation; it recognizes a fundamental motive, respect for the moral law, 
but it denies the moral value of other motivational factors, which are 
generically grouped under the concept of inclination (Neigung). Virtue 
ethics, on the contrary, not only recognizes the importance of the motives of 
action, but also offers a rich account of moral motivation; thoughts, desires 
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or feelings have motivational force and play a crucial role in the moral 
evaluation of actions. One can even attribute a motivational pluralism to 
virtue ethics; according to Valerie Tiberius, there are as many motivations                 
as there are virtues.1  
Virtue ethics may be considered an ethics of harmony, in the sense that 
it tries to reconcile our affective and emotional life with the rational side of 
human nature. In opposition to what Stocker called “the schizophrenia of 
modern moral theories”, virtue ethics avoids a gap between the motives and 
the reasons of an agent. In his words: “we should be moved by our major 
values, and we should value what our major motives seek. (…) [S]uch 
harmony is a mark of a good life”.2 
Aristotle, the main historical advocate of virtue ethics, conceived of 
virtue as a disposition to act, a perceptual capacity and a power to regulate 
emotions. However, he was not totally clear on the exact nature of the 
relation between reason and desire,3 and this indeterminacy leads to a 
conflict of interpretations, with “Humean” or “quasi-Humean” interpreters 
arguing that human action has its source in desires, not in reason, whereas 
their opponents emphasize the role of reason and cognitive states in moral 
motivation.  
On behalf of the “Humean” interpretation, it is usual to quote those 
passages (sometimes called the “Goal passages”) where Aristotle stresses 
that the goals of our actions are given by moral virtues and that moral 
deliberation only reflects on the means leading to those ends.4 In fact, these 
passages do not constitute decisive evidence for a Humean interpretation of 
Aristotle, since it is plausible to argue that deliberation, despite departing 
from previously given ends, plays a crucial role in the contextual 
determination of these ends; virtue supplies our ends, determinable ends, but 
deliberation and practical wisdom (phronêsis) make them determinate.5  
                                                     
1. V. Tiberius, Moral Psychology, London/New York, Routledge, p. 108. 
2. M. Stocker, “The schizophrenia of modern moral theories”, in Virtue Ethics, R. Crisp and 
M. Slote (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 66.  
3. For instance, in a passage on the distinction between the rational and irrational parts of                    
the soul, Aristotle dismisses, as not relevant for his purposes, the question of whether they                     
are really separate or whether they are “distinct by definition, but by nature inseparable,                     
like convex and concave in the circumference of a circle” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1102a26-32). 
The translations from Aristotle follow this publication: The Complete Works of Aristotle:                    
The revised Oxford translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press. 1984.  
4. See, for example, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1144a7-9: “excellence [aretê] makes the 
aim right, and practical wisdom [phronêsis] the things leading to it.” 
5. We can distinguish, with John McDowell, between two different accounts of deliberation 
that recognize the specificatory (and not merely instrumental) role of practical reasoning: one 
that conceives of practical thought as “shaping part of the general content of a conception of 
the end”, and another that conceives of it as “discerning what an already held conception                 
of the end requires of one in a given predicament” (J. McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 32). McDowell endorses the latter 
account.  
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This “specificationist” view of practical reason clearly differs from the 
instrumentalist account that is traditionally attributed to Hume. Moreover, 
far from conceiving of reason as “the slave of the passions”, Aristotle claims 
that the non-rational part of the soul obeys the rational part.6 The Aristotelian 
distinction between passion and reason does not entail that passions are 
deprived of reason or that reason lacks motivating power. As Rosalind 
Hursthouse claims, in her defence of virtue ethics and in her interpretation of 
Aristotle, emotions are Janus-faced: “animal and/or non-rational one face; 
rational the other”.7 In contrast with the Humean thesis that there is only                   
one principle of action (passion or desire), Aristotle claims that in the case of 
the human being there are two principles of action which do not always 
agree.8 In a similar vein, Aristotle contrasts desire or appetite (epithumia) 
with choice (prohairesis), which is conceived of as a “deliberate desire 
[bouleutikê orexis] of things in our own power”. His distinction between               
the continent (enkratês) and incontinent (akratês) person is also based on 
this contrast: the “incontinent man acts with appetite, but not with choice; 
while the continent man on the contrary acts with choice, but not with 
appetite”.9  
It is true that Aristotle says that practical wisdom depends on ethical 
virtues, but the opposite is also true. On the one hand, ethical virtue requires 
reason, because virtues are dispositions “concerned with choice, lying in a 
mean relative to us, this being determined by reason [logos] and in the way 
in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it”.10 On the other 
hand, virtue co-operates with a “right reason” (orthos logos) provided by 
phronêsis, and for this reason there are no ethical virtues without practical 
wisdom.11 Equally significant is the Aristotelian distinction between natural 
virtue, as displayed by children, for instance, and virtue in a proper sense, 
which requires thought.12 
A purely “Humean” interpretation seems to be simply wrong, but there 
are moderate or “quasi-Humean” interpretations. A case in point is Jessica 
Moss, but her attempt to offer a “modified” Humean interpretation is 
vulnerable to at least two objections. Firstly, she accepts that Aristotelian 
deliberation cannot be reduced to instrumental reasoning or means-ends 
calculations: “deliberation is a process of making an indeterminate end 
                                                     
6. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1102b25-1103a5.  
7. R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 110. 
8. The following passage from the Eudemian Ethics clearly shows this fundamental difference 
between Aristotle and Hume: “And so with the other animals the action on compulsion is 
simple (just as in the inanimate), for they have not desire [orexis] and reason [logos] opposing 
one another, but live by desire; but man has both” (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1224a25-30; 
cf. Hursthouse, op. cit., p. 102-103). 
9. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a11 and 1111b14-15. 
10. Ibid., 1106b36-1107a2. 
11. Cf. ibid., 1144b20-31. 
12. Cf. ibid., 1144b1-14. 
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sufficiently determinate to be acted upon”.13 However, this is a very 
substantial concession from a Humean standpoint, which makes the label 
“quasi-Humean” dubious. Secondly, she tries to downplay the role of reason 
in moral education, making the strong claim that the content of our ends “is 
dictated entirely by one’s nonrational upbringing and character”,14 but this is 
not a charitable interpretation of Aristotle; it is very difficult to reconcile           
this claim with the observation of ordinary processes of moral upbringing, 
which often involve justifications or the presentation of reasons.15 In sum, 
even “modified”, “Humean” interpretations of Aristotle are not convincing. 
At any rate, my main intention is not exegetical, but philosophical, and 
in what follows I will propose an account of virtue ethics, inspired by 
Aristotle, that rejects the modern dichotomy between cognition and volition. 
If we accept, as we should, that the cultivation of virtues is not a mere 
process of moral conditioning, but involves (paraphrasing a well-known 
phrase from Sellars) “the game of giving and asking for reasons”, we arrive 
naturally at a conception of virtue as a disposition that inextricably combines 
cognitive and volitional or conative factors. It is precisely because moral 
education and habituation are not a blind, nonrational, unreflective process 
that desires, as moulded inclinations, far from being brute causal forces, 
have a rational character. As Norman Dahl put it, in his interpretation of 
Aristotle: “Mind [nous] is a source of action because it contributes to the 
desires that move people to act”16. 
 
 
2. Moral perception 
 
The idea of moral perception provides another important reason                     
to reject the cognitive/volitional dichotomy. According to a Humean 
                                                     
13. J. Moss, “Was Aristotle a Humean”, in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, R. Polansky (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, 
p. 238. Moss endorses, in this context, the interpretation of the Aristotelian deliberation 
proposed by Daniel Russell, who claims, in particular, that “deliberating about ‘things that are 
conducive to ends’ includes thinking about not only means to an end but also the very 
specification of that end in more concrete terms” (D. Russell, “Phronesis and the Virtues”, 
in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, R. Polansky, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 205. 
14. J. Moss, op. cit., p. 234. 
15. In the words of Daniel Russell: “For Aristotle, training in virtue is simultaneously a blend 
of rational and non-rational training: and in fact, that simultaneous blend seems to be what we 
actually observe” (“Aristotle on Cultivating Virtue”, in Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from 
Psychology, Theology, and Psychology, N. Snow (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2015, p. 26. For a well-argued interpretation of Aristotelian habituation as a reflective and 
critical process, see N. Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s theory of virtue, 
Oxford, Clarendon, 1989, ch. 5. 
16. N. Dahl, “Aristotle on Action, Practical Reason, and Weakness of the Will”, The 
Blackwell Companion to Aristotle, in G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), Oxford, Blackwell, 2009, 
p. 498.  
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perspective, the world is constituted by “morally inert facts”,17 and moral 
evaluations have their source in our feelings. Since there is not a moral 
reality, the very notion of moral perception could be considered a category 
mistake. Things are different in virtue ethics, because it is possible to show 
how life experience and the cultivation of virtues affect our perception of the 
world. On the one hand, the moral upbringing and education of virtuous 
agents is a process whereby they obtain knowledge of many relevant 
situations and, consequently, an interpretive framework that will shape the 
perception of future, similar situations. On the other hand, the intellectual 
virtue of phronêsis, practical wisdom, also benefits from the virtuous agent’s 
experience, enabling her or him to identify the morally relevant aspects                   
of a situation. It is related to capacities like sunesis (“understanding” or 
“comprehension”) and gnômê (“judgment” or “discernment”), which are 
discriminatory abilities. The former contributes to reading the relevant 
details of a situation one is in by considering the perspectives of other 
agents. In the words of Rosalind Hursthouse, sunesis “involves judging what 
other people say, particularly about their own, or someone else’s, actions 
and/or feelings”.18 Gnômê, in turn, is briefly defined by Aristotle as “the 
right discrimination of equitable”.19 He adds that the equitable man is a “man 
of forgiveness”, but an adequate understanding of gnômê must take also into 
consideration the analysis of the virtue of equity at the end of Book V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, where it is presented as the capacity to correct general 
laws in the presence of exceptional cases. Generalizations in the ethical 
domain hold only in most cases, and for this reason practical wisdom 
requires a special sensitivity to exceptional or atypical cases. According to 
Daniel Russell, phronêsis and the aforementioned discriminatory capacities 
“extract relevant information from one’s surroundings that might well be lost 
on others”.20 The use of the expression “relevant information” is particularly 
significant in this context, because it shows the entanglement of cognitive 
and evaluative factors in moral perception; information is a cognitive notion, 
but relevance depends on evaluative judgments.  
Understood in these terms, there is nothing mysterious in the idea of 
moral perception; like perception in general, moral perception is based on 
pattern-recognition,21 with the difference that the corresponding patterns are 
not merely physical, because they can only be grasped by someone with the 
                                                     
17. N. Athanassoulis, Virtue Ethics, London/New York, Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 74. 
18. R. Hursthouse, “Practical wisdom: A mundane account”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, 106, (2006), p. 293. She also claims that the perceptual model of practical wisdom 
leads to “the neglect of the others” (ibid., p. 287), but advocates of this model (like Wiggins 
or McDowell) can, and should, incorporate the perspectives of other agents in the notion of 
moral perception. 
19. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1143a20. 
20. D. Russell, “Aristotle on Cultivating Virtue”, in Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from 
Psychology, Theology, and Psychology, N. Snow (ed.) Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2015, p. 25. 
21. Cf. T. Chappell, “Moral Perception”, Philosophy, 83, (2008), p. 421-437. 
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required moral education and experience. Since access to reality is mediated 
by perceptual and discriminatory capacities, whose development involves a 
mix of cognitive, emotional and conative factors, moral agents do interact 
with a value-laden reality. With the collapse of the cognitive/volitional 
dichotomy, the fact/value dichotomy also falls apart.  
Far from being a passive appreciation of the morally relevant aspects of 
reality, moral perception is, in the case of the virtuous agents, intrinsically 
motivating; it is a “desire-infused perception”.22 If they perceive that a 
particular situation might be humiliating for someone, they would act in 
order to avoid humiliation; if they perceive that someone needs help, this 
perception immediately motivates them to help. Quoting Margaret Little: 
“There are certain ways of seeing or of conceiving the world, as many have 
put it, that one cannot have without reacting affectively in a certain way”.23 
McDowell’s defence of moral perception is particularly relevant in this 
context, not only because of his illuminating analysis of the notion, but also 
because he integrates moral perception into a broader epistemological 
framework. In fact, McDowell endorses a “naturalism of the second nature” 
or an “Aristotelian naturalism”, according to which our access to reality                   
is mediated by a conceptual web and a space of reasons, into which an 
individual is initiated through the development of human conceptual 
capacities in a process that is simultaneously natural and cultural. Moral 
education is one of the dimensions of this initiation into a “space of 
reasons”.24 Against the “disenchanted nature” of the modern science, the 
“naturalism of the second nature” leads to a “partial re-enchantment of 
nature”,25 in the sense that nature reveals itself as already being infused                 
with meaning and value.  
The notion of moral perception arises naturally in this epistemological 
framework. Virtue as a perceptual capacity is a form of knowledge; “The 
deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge”.26 Moral 
perception is characterized by a grasp of the morally relevant aspects of a 
situation:  
                                                     
22. C. Reeve, “Aristotle on the Virtues of Thought”, The Blackwell Companion to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, in R. Kraut, Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, p. 209. 
23. M. Little, “Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind”, Noûs, 3, 
(1997), p. 71.  
24. “Moulding ethical character (...) is a particular case of a general phenomenon: initiation 
into conceptual capacities which include responsiveness to other rational demands besides 
those of ethics” (J. McDowell, Mind and World, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
1996 [1994], p. 84) . In a similar vein, John McDowell also claims that the topic of Book II of 
the Nicomachean Ethics is “initiation into a conceptual space” (J. McDowell, Mind, Value, 
and Reality, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, p. 39).  
25. J. McDowell, Mind and World, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996 [1994], 
p. 88.  
26. J. McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998, 
p. 51.  
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It is by virtue of his seeing this particular fact rather than that one as the 
salient fact about the situation that he is moved to act by this concern rather 
than that one. This perception of saliences is the shape taken here by the 
appreciation of particular cases.27 
 
On the one hand, and to the extent that virtues are closely related to 
desires and dispositions to act, virtues have a volitional character; on the 
other hand, and taken as a perception of the morally relevant aspects of a 
situation, they have a cognitive character too. In this sense, virtue ethics can 
be considered a form of moral cognitivism. There is moral knowledge, and 
cognitive states like perceptions can motivate our actions. The development 
of this position can take two forms: to posit the existence of sui generis 
mental states that are simultaneously cognitive and volitional (with a double 
“direction of fit”28) or, alternatively, to claim more modestly that certain 
beliefs or perceptions are accompanied by certain reactions or desires.  
 
 
3. The nature of moral judgment 
 
The rejection of the cognitive/volitional dichotomy entails a rejection of 
the so-called “Humean theory of motivation”, the view that “motivation has 
its source in the presence of a relevant desire and a means-end belief”.29 We 
can again follow John McDowell, now in his interpretation of practical 
syllogism, in order to clarify this point. He opposes the tendency to 
decompose such a syllogism in two distinct and heterogeneous components: 
a volitional and non-cognitive state (present in the major premise) and a 
belief (present in the minor premise), understood as a cognitive state 
deprived of motivating power. The notion of moral perception undermines 
such a decomposition. The concerns that motivate an agent cannot be 
considered as independent of her perception of the situation. Again quoting 
Margaret Little, someone who considers virtue a form of knowledge may 
well claim that “all motivational failures do involve a cognitive failure, for 
the simple reason that, since the virtuous person’s ideal conception of a 
situation guarantees proper motivation, any who are not moved cannot                   
be enjoying that conception”.30 However, this is not exactly McDowell’s 
view, because he recommends a “a less extreme possibility” suggested by 
Aristotle: 
                                                     
27. Ibid., p. 68. 
28. Beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit, whereas desires have a world-to-mind 
direction (see, for example, M. Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation”, Mind, 96, 
(1987), p. 36-61. 
29. M. Smith, op. cit., p. 36.  
30. M. Little, op. cit., p. 72. 
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to allow that someone who fails to act virtuously may, in a way, perceive 
what a virtuous person would, so that his failure to do the right thing is not 
inadvertent; but to insist that his failure occurs only because his appreciation of 
what he perceives is clouded, or unfocused, by the impact of the desire to do 
otherwise. This preserves the identification of virtue with a sensitivity.31 
 
Here, the fundamental factor is the “deliverances of the sensitivity”, 
which can be available to both the virtuous and non-virtuous person, but in 
the latter there is some deficiency in the approach to the situation. Using 
metaphorical terms (“clouded”, “unfocused”), McDowell attempts to strike a 
difficult balance between the thesis that moral knowledge moves us to act 
and the thesis that the virtuous and the non-virtuous person can have the 
same cognitive access to a situation.  
The centrality of moral perception in this account of virtue ethics has 
important implications at the level of moral judgment. The idea of moral 
perception seems to be incompatible with an account of moral judgment as 
the result of a weighing of different reasons, and this consequence is clearly 
accepted by McDowell:  
The distinction [between the virtuous and continent person] becomes 
intelligible if we stop assuming that the virtuous person’s judgment is a result 
of balancing reasons for or against. The view of a situation that he arrives at by 
exercising his sensitivity is one in which some aspect of the situation is seen as 
constituting a reason for acting in some way; this reason is apprehended, not               
as outweighing or overriding any reasons for acting in other ways (…), but as 
silencing them.32 
 
McDowell qualifies as “incredible” the view that virtuous actions are 
the result of reasoning, but how can we reconcile this claim with the 
Aristotelian emphasis on the role of deliberation in moral judging? He tries 
to remain faithful to his Aristotelian inspiration by interpreting “Aristotle’s 
discussion of deliberation as aimed at the reconstruction of reasons for 
actions not necessarily thought out in advance”.33 It seems, however, that 
there is no real problem in recognizing the importance of both moral 
perception and deliberation in moral judging. An analogy with chess can 
clarify this point. Chess masters often, and successfully, rely on intuition, 
which is usually defined in the field of psychology of expertise as pattern-
recognition. But when they are confronted with unfamiliar and complex 
situations they can no longer rely solely on intuition and have to delve                   
into complex calculations. Thinking and decision-making processes in chess 
require a permanent oscillation between intuition and calculation. One                   
can admit, with McDowell, that moral judgment is usually spontaneous                    
                                                     
31. J. McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998, 
p. 54. 
32. Ibid., p. 55-56. 
33. Ibid., p. 66, n. 22. 
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in familiar situations that exhibit an already known pattern, but the 
phenomenology of moral judgment shows us that there are also non-familiar 
situations where we are confronted with new problems and hard cases to 
which we do not have an already formed answer. In this type of situation, 
different moral rules may enter into conflict and the moral judgment must 
weigh the reasons for or against a certain course of action. McDowell has the 
merit of offering a description of the habitual moral judgment of a virtuous 




4. Rules and moral judgment 
 
Virtue ethics is opposed to any type of “one-size-fits-all decision 
procedure”34 and is often combined with to the so-called Uncodifiability 
Thesis: the view that moral knowledge cannot be codified in a set of rules or 
principles.35 Rule-based accounts of ethics face, indeed, two fundamental 
problems. Firstly, there is a gap between general principles and the 
unpredictable diversity of situations that demand moral decisions; as a result, 
it is often very difficult to determine how to apply a principle to atypical, 
unfamiliar situations. It is even possible to arrive at different conclusions 
departing from the same principle. Secondly, as the existence of moral 
dilemmas demonstrates, there can be clashes between equally valuable 
principles, depriving thereby the agent of action guidance. The problem 
becomes even more complicated when we take into consideration the 
nuanced character of the moral judgment in virtue ethics, where it is not 
enough to judge in general terms whether an action is right; one must also be 
sensitive to the contextual, sometimes unique details of a situation, which 
cannot be anticipated by general rules. As Aristotle said, a virtuous person 
knows how to feel or act towards “the right person, to the right extent, at the 
right time, with the right aim, and in the right way”. And he adds: “that is not 
for every one, nor is it easy”…36  
                                                     
34. J. Annas, Intelligent Virtue, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 164. 
35. McDowell’s “Virtue and Reason” is an exemplary defence of the Uncodifiability Thesis. 
Its target is the idea that “the virtuous person’s views about how, in general, one should 
behave are susceptible of codification, in principles apt for serving as major premises in 
[practical] syllogisms” (J. McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1998, p. 57).  
36. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1109a26-9. Daniel Russell illustrates the fine-grained 
moral evaluations that are typical of virtue ethics with the example of generosity: “Sometimes 
helping means giving a little, sometimes it means giving a lot; sometimes it means giving 
money, sometimes it means giving time, or just a sympathetic ear; sometimes it means 
offering advice, sometimes it means minding one’s own business; and which of these it might 
mean in this case will depend on such different things as my relationship with my friend, what 
I am actually able to offer, why and how often my friend has problems of this kind, and                 
so on” (“Aristotle on Cultivating Virtue”, in N. Snow (ed.), Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives 
from Psychology, Theology, and Psychology, Oxford, Oxford UP, 2015, p. 37-38). 
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The Uncodifiability Thesis can be given a weak or a strong formulation. 
According to the weak formulation, rules or principles are insufficient to 
guide human action, according to the strong one, they are irrelevant. 
Aristotle, the main advocate of virtue ethics in the history of philosophy, 
endorses the former, more moderate version, which could be called the 
Insufficiency Thesis. Ethical generalizations are possible, but they typically 
hold only for the most part and allow for exceptions. Rules like “we must for 
the most part return benefits” or “we must pay back a loan to a creditor” are 
generally true, but unusual circumstances may justify exceptions;37 in the 
case of debts, Aristotle remarks that if  aa gift is “exceedingly noble or 
exceedingly necessary”, a debtor might be justified in not paying what is 
owed. The already mentioned virtue of equity (epieikeia), understood as a 
corrective of the application of law, provides a good illustration of this point. 
Because laws are too generic to accommodate all the possible circumstances 
of their application, the administration of justice requires the ability to 
identify omissions and to correct them: 
all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a 
universal statement which will be correct. (...) When the law speaks 
universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal 
statement, then it is right, when the legislator fails us and has erred by over-
simplicity, to correct the omission. (...) And this is the nature of the equitable, a 
correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.38 
 
There is, in fact, an important analogy between legal reasoning and 
moral reasoning; in both cases the application of rules cannot be considered 
a mechanical act or a linear, deductive inference, but an act that requires 
sensitivity to relevant aspects of a case or situation that cannot be handled by 
decision procedures. 
Because phronêsis or practical wisdom cannot be reduced to a 
knowledge of universal principles, Aristotle emphasizes that it requires two 
types of knowledge: knowledge of the universal and knowledge of particular 
facts: “Nor is practical reason concerned with universals only – it must                
also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice [praxis] is 
concerned with particulars”.39 He even suggests that, in the domain of action, 
knowledge of particulars might be more important. 
At any rate, it would be inaccurate to interpret Aristotle as proposing a 
wholesale rejection of universal rules. Adultery, theft and murder, for 
instance, are intrinsically bad and always wrong,40 and in this sense the 
condemnation of such acts amounts to universal rules. This is not a challenge 
to the Uncodifiability Thesis, however, because such absolute prohibitions 
                                                     
37. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1164b30–1165a5. 
38. Ibid., 1137b13-27. 
39. Ibid., 1141b14-16. 
40. Ibid., 1107a10-14. 
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have a very limited practical role as action-guiding rules in everyday life. On 
the other hand, if we accept, as proposed by Timothy Chappell41, that it is 
very difficult to separate moral rules from moral reasons, because the latter 
have a certain degree of generality, then virtue ethicists may recognize the 
existence of a broader type of rules, but in this weak sense they do not have 
the same degree of normative force that is usually associated with the rules 
of a moral code.  
 
 
5. The reliability of moral judgments in virtue ethics 
 
Critics of virtue ethics often complain that this type of normative ethics 
is unable to provide action guidance. In order to assess this criticism, let us 
consider the following “specification” of right action proposed by Rosalind 
Hursthouse: “An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would 
characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances”.42 This 
formulation seems vacuous. Hursthouse argues that the consequentialist’s 
appeal to “best consequences” and the deontologist’s invocation of a 
“correct moral rule” is equally vague and in need of further specification, but 
this reply is a tu quoque argument that does not address the worry that virtue 
ethics might be irremediably vague and unable to provide action guidance. 
Hursthouse also claims that we can complement the proposed account of 
right action either by presenting a list of virtues or by giving a general 
definition of virtue, but even with these qualifications the proposal remains 
vague. 
In the tradition of virtue ethics it is, in fact, common to stress the role of 
the virtuous agent as a guide for moral judgments and decisions. Aristotle, 
for instance, claimed that the virtuous person “differs from others most by 
seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and 
measure of them”.43 However, such an appeal to virtuous agents is 
problematic. They are, in fact, reliable guides, and one can even say that 
“virtuous acts track right actions”,44 but it is relatively easy to make a list of 
relevant objections to the proposed equation of virtuous action and right 
action.45 For instance, how can we identify a virtuous agent? How can we 
imagine what an ideal virtuous agent would do in the circumstances? Even 
accepting that the set of right actions is co-extensive with the set of the 
moral actions of virtuous agents, the property of “being an action done by a 
virtuous agent” is unsatisfactory as a characterization of a right action, 
because it does not shed light on why an action is right.  
                                                     
41. Cf. T. Chappell, “Virtues and rules”, in S. Hooft (ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, 
Durham, Acumen, 2014, p. 76-87. 
42. R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 28. 
43. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a32-33. 
44. H. Battaly, Virtue, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2015, p. 119.  
45. Cf. N. Athanassoulis, op. cit., p. 68-69. 
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In order to overcome these difficulties, one should complement the 
consideration of the actions of virtuous agents with an analysis of the 
conditions of their reliability as ethical models. Virtue ethicists frequently 
use the words “reliable”, “reliability” and “reliably”; virtues are reliable 
dispositions to feel and to act, and virtuous agents are, accordingly, reliable 
in their judgments and decisions. The notion of moral reliability is, at first 
glance, obscure and mysterious, but it is possible to make it plausible as a 
key notion of virtue ethics. Aristotle already offered us important indications 
regarding the roots of the reliability of virtuous agents. He emphasized the 
role of a proper upbringing,46 of experience and of examples or models (like 
Pericles), but it is necessary to go beyond Aristotle to legitimize the idea of 
moral reliability. 
Experience is, in fact, a fundamental precondition of the exercise of 
moral judgment because, as we have seen, rules and principles are 
insufficient. Experience provides us with a vast repertoire of particular 
situations and examples of good and bad decisions, and on the basis of this 
“knowledge of particular facts” the virtuous agent can spot similarities 
between a present situation and past ones. In other words, experience 
promotes pattern-recognition and the exercise of analogical reasoning, 
thereby helping to refine our capacity of judgment and our “perception of 
saliences”. 
The Hegelian and Gadamerian analysis of the negativity of experience 
helps us to understand and ground the ethical relevance of experience. 
According to Hegel’s account of experience in The Phenomenology of Spirit, 
to make an experience is to become aware of the inadequacy of our 
conception of the objects; it involves a reversal of consciousness whereby 
we realize that things are not as we thought they were. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, in his analysis of the hermeneutic experience, also stresses the 
negative character of experience; “experience is initially always experience 
of negation: something is not what we supposed it to be”; “every experience 
worthy of the name thwarts an expectation”.47 Hermeneutic experiences 
transform their subject by correcting prejudices, or the inadequacy and 
limitations of one’s pre-understanding of the world, and by offering a deeper 
knowledge of other people and cultures. Needless to say, the correction                  
of prejudices and the openness to the alterity of the other significantly 
contributes to the development of our capacity of moral judgment. 
Examples and models also develop, as we have seen, our capacity of 
moral judgment. Plutarch’s Parallel Lives are an interesting example, 
because this series of biographies is also an Aristotle-inspired exercise                   
in moral philosophy. The author of the Nicomachean Ethics stressed the 
importance of knowledge of particular facts to moral education, and 
                                                     
46. Aristotle claims that only those who “have been brought up in good habits” can benefit 
from the teachings of the Nicomachean Ethics (1095b5). 
47. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, New York/London, Continuum, 2003, p. 354 and 356. 
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Plutarch’s biographies have a moral function precisely because they offer 
many particular cases of exemplary, virtuous actions (as well as wrong          
ones, which are also instructive). But Plutarch is not an isolated case; his 
motivation is typical in the humanist movement. The following presentation 
of the humanist educational ideal is, in this respect, very instructive: 
Humanist educators aimed to create a particular type of person: men and 
women who would be virtuous because they had read and identified with 
powerful examples of classical virtue; who would be prudent because they had 
extended their human experience into the distant past through the study of 
history; and who would be eloquent, able to communicate virtue and prudence 
to others, because they had studied the most eloquent writers and speakers of 
the past.48 
 
Here we see the deep connection between virtue ethics and the humanist 
tradition. Virtue ethics is the ethical theory most suited to humanism, and 
humanism offers an educational ideal that perfectly complements virtue 
ethics. One can plausibly claim that virtue ethics and humanistic education 
are two faces of the same coin. 
There is a further element in the humanist tradition that can shed light 
on the Aristotelian claim that a proper upbringing contributes to the 
reliability of virtuous agents: reflection on the idea of Bildung in the German 
neo-humanist movement, developed by the likes of Humboldt, Herder, 
Goethe, Schiller, Hegel and, more recently, Gadamer. Bildung is a modern 
and liberal educational ideal. It has been presented, since its origins in the 
18th century, as a free and autonomous process of inner transformation that             
is characterized by a harmonious development of human beings in their 
affective, intellectual and moral dimensions. It involves, accordingly, 
knowledge of history, art, literature and philosophy. Also significant in the 
idea of Bildung is the insistence on the formative importance of experiences 
– both life experiences and the human experiences that are transmitted 
through a humanistic education. 
Gadamer’s conception of Bildung deserves a special reference in this 
context, because it is developed, in his opus magnum Truth and Method, in 
conjunction with an account of practical reason inspired by Aristotle, and 
one can legitimately interpret Gadamer’s own account of practical reason            
as having its roots in a combination of the humanist idea of Bildung and                
the Aristotelian notion of phronêsis. The Gadamerian analysis of Bildung 
takes place in an epistemological framework that stresses the role of 
prejudices as ineliminable, yet partially controllable conditions of knowledge 
and understanding. As a result of the pervasive character of prejudices, 
understanding is not conceived of as a reconstruction of thoughts or mental 
                                                     
48. C. Kallendorf, “Introduction”, in C. Kallendorf (ed.), Humanist Educational Treatises, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002, p. vii-viii. 
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states but as a “fusion of horizons”, a process in which the perspectives of 
the interpreter and the interpretandum interact, generating a new perspective 
on a particular subject. The important point to retain in this context is that 
genuine understanding typically transforms the interpreter by challenging 
their prejudices and broadening her view of the human reality. Gadamerian 
Bildung is an endless process of fusions of horizons, multiplication of 
hermeneutic experiences and correction of prejudices. The result is a 
refinement of our capacity of (moral) judgement; the gebildete person has a 
better understanding of other people, and because she has accumulated many 
experiences, she also has a rich knowledge of particular facts that Aristotle 
deemed as a key requirement of practical wisdom. There are, naturally, 
differences between the idea of Bildung and the Greek conception of 
paideia. Bildung, as a non-teleological process of self-determination that 
involves an openness to other cultures, is a modern educational idea, but this 
difference should be welcomed as an enrichment of virtue ethics.  
One may object that even if the preceding considerations shed some 
light on how we can develop our capacity of moral judgment, there still 
remains a gap in the clarification of the notion of “proper upbringing”, 
because it also involves a regulation of emotions and desires, and a mere 
appeal to the educational role of family and community is not satisfactory. 
Here, again, it is possible go beyond the vague formulations that are usual in 
the tradition of virtue ethics, by exploring a dialogue with psychology, 
especially with the psychology of emotions and the psychology of empathy. 
This is a large topic, which cannot be developed in the present article, but 
because of its relevance in this context I will briefly sketch its significance      
to virtue ethics. 
Empathy, understood as the capacity to reconstitute or re-experience the 
mental states of other people, can be included in the family of skills 
associated with phronêsis; something like empathy is implicit in the 
aforementioned notion of sunesis.49 In fact, moral perception is clearly 
defective if the subject does not correctly grasp the mental states of the 
actors involved in a particular situation. It is important to stress that empathy 
is not a mere natural endowment, because it can be cultivated through 
different means. For instance, Martin Hoffman, who argues that empathy 
plays a fundamental role in the development of moral conscience, presents 
different forms of empathy induction. One important form consists of 
socializing processes that expose children to a diversified set of emotions, 
thereby increasing the scope of their empathic capacity. Another consists                  
of giving affection to children, because children living in affective 
environments tend to be more attentive to the needs of others. The example 
of adults who express their sympathetic feelings towards people in need is 
also an effective means of developing empathy in the moral development of 
                                                     
49. Michael Slote is an example of a virtue ethicist who has dedicated special attention to an 
ethics of care and empathy (cf. M. Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, London, 
Routledge, 2007).  
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children.50 The fact that empathy, as a requirement of our exercise of moral 
judgment, can be explained and cultivated in a non-mysterious way helps to 
clarify the idea of moral reliability in virtue ethics.  
The regulation of emotions, another important precondition of moral 
judgment according to virtue ethics, is also an important research topic 
involving psychology and philosophy. Kristján Kristjánsson offers a useful 
overview of the extensive psychological research on “tools and techniques” 
of emotion regulation.51 The author classifies them into three types of 
strategies: behavioural, conative and cognitive. The first type of strategies 
tries to regulate emotions by changing behaviour. One can, for instance, 
control certain emotions by avoiding the occasions that trigger them or by 
shifting the focus of one’s attention. At a deeper level, conative strategies 
help regulate emotions by inducing modifications to desires and attitudes. 
Finally, cognitive strategies “involve a reframing or change in the cognitions 
that underlie our emotions”52. Such a classification relies on a “cognitive 
view of the emotions as potentially infused with reason and amenable to 
cultivation and coaching”,53 a view that has Aristotelian roots and is widely 
accepted in contemporary philosophy and psychology. The empirically-
minded Aristotle would certainly appreciate contemporary research on the 





As I have tried to show, one major contribution by virtue ethics to 
normative ethics in general is its analysis of the capacity of moral judgment, 
qua practical capacity, and of the possibilities to develop and refine it. Even 
proponents of rule-based accounts of ethics have to recognize that 
sometimes moral agents struggle with hard cases or apparently irresolvable 
dilemmas, where the application of moral principles or rules is unclear, 
either due to difficulties in characterizing a situation, or due to the absence 
of compelling decision procedures and ranking rules (rules that establish a 
hierarchy of conflicting rules or principles). With its analysis of virtue as 
habituated dispositions to feel and act correctly, of moral perception, and            
of the role played by experience, examples and models in moral judging, 
virtue ethics shows how an agent can reliably judge a situation and act in the 
right way. 
                                                     
50. M. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, p. 288-289. 
51. Cf. K. Kristjánsson, Aristotle, Emotions, and Education, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2007, 
p. 71-74. 
52. Ibid., p. 73. 
53. Ibid., p. 1.  
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Since virtue ethics does not provide moral codes or algorithmic decision 
procedures, this idea of moral reliability plays a key role that demands an 
effort to provide clarification, without which the whole project of virtue 
ethics falters. However, the reliability of the virtuous agent is often more 
presupposed than explained, and for this reason I have tried to show that 
moral reliability, far from being an irredeemably vague and obscure notion, 
has clear sources and foundations, and can be developed in a non-mysterious 
way.  
The centrality of virtue in moral philosophy is a fundamental tenet               
of virtue ethics that cannot be accepted by advocates of consequentialist                 
or deontological approaches to ethics. However, a theory of virtues can be 
easily integrated into these approaches; a consequentialist might be sensitive 
to the fact that virtues are character traits that produce generally good effects 
or consequences and a deontologist philosopher may prize virtue to the 
extent that it promotes self-control and the moral strength that is necessary              
to act from duty. Considering that virtue ethics offers important insights 
regarding the nature of moral education and the refinement of our capacity 
of moral judgment, there are strong reasons to claim that a theory of virtues 
is not only compatible with other types of normative ethics, but should be 
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